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Abstract: How much to drive, and how much to use public transport, are modelled as
three- and two level decisions, respectively, based on micro-data for Sweden. The
choices whether to have a car, whether to drive given access to a car, and how much to
drive given that the individual drives at all are then estimated using a three equation
model. Also after correcting for other variables, such as income, men are driving much
more, and using less public transport, compared to women. People living in big cities
are less likely to drive, but those who do are on average driving about as much as
others. Age and access to company-cars are also important determinants for travel
behaviour, but being a member of an environmental organisation is not. Driving
increases with income, but to a lower degree compared to most aggregated studies on
national level. The difference is explained in a simple model with income-dependent
structural changes, implying that it becomes more difficult to live without a car when
average income increases. This indirect effect is found to be of a similar size as the
ordinary income elasticity typically found in cross-section analysis within a country or
region.
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I. Introduction
The aim of this paper is to estimate both individual (as opposed to household) annual
driving-distance by car and the annual number of public-transport trips, as functions of
explanatory variables such as income, age, sex etc. In the driving-distance case, the
travel choice is modelled as a three-level decision.
1 The first decision is whether to
have a car or not, the second whether to drive or not given that the household has a
car, and the third is how much to drive given that the individual drives at all. For
public transport, the first decision is whether to use public transport at all, and the
second decision is how much to travel given a positive public-transport use.
It is of interest to know the determinants of individual travel behaviour for
several reasons. First, from a policy perspective it is important to know the
consequences of various measures. For example, proposed increases of fuel taxes, or
other transport-related taxes or charges, are almost always followed by distributional
discussions, both regarding income groups and regions. Second, they may be of
interest from a gender and age perspective; and third, it is interesting to see whether or
not attitudes towards the environment matter for actual travel behaviour.
This study is based on data from the Household Market and  Nonmarket
Activities (HUS) survey, which includes a representative Swedish sample of 3240
individuals (adults) in 1922 households, conducted in 1996. The survey consists of
two parts: A panel survey, addressed to respondents who have been interviewed
before, and a supplementary survey addressed to young people in the households who
were born between 1975 and 1977, as well as certain new household members who
had not previously been interviewed. For the panel survey (about 95% of the
respondents), a combined contact and main interview was conducted by telephone,
after which a self-enumerated questionnaire was sent out to each respondent by mail.
For the supplementary survey, the respondents were not interviewed by telephone until
they had been interviewed personally.
Section II provides a descriptive picture of the travel pattern and Section III
aims at explaining this pattern by means of econometric analysis. Section IV discusses
and tries to explain the large differences found between income elasticites of car use in
cross-section analysis within a country, on the one hand, and cross-section between3
countries or time-series analysis on the other. Section V summarises and provides
some concluding remarks for policy.
II. DESCRIBING THE TRAVEL PATTERN
Annual Private Driving Distance
3065 individuals, or about 95% of the total sample, answered the driving-distance
question. Table 1 reports the annual driving-distance for the whole sample, as well as
for various sub-samples divided on men and women; big cities, intermediate cities and
other areas;
2 whether the household has access to a car or not; whether the individual
is driving or not; and whether the household has access to a so called company-car or
not.
We see that men have a very much larger mean driving-distance than women,
and that this difference depends both on the mean driving-distance for those who drive
and on a larger fraction of non-drivers among women, which is consistent with earlier
research such as Polk (1998). We also see that the driving-distance is consistently
larger in all sub-groups for those who have access to a so called company-car, i.e., a
car which is paid by the firm and for which the driver has virtually zero marginal cost
on private trips.
3 The fraction of non-drivers is larger in big cities, but the mean
driving-distance for drivers is about the same as for those living in the countryside and
in smaller cities.
[Table 1 about here]
Public-transport Use
3134 individuals, or about 97% of the total sample, answered the public-transport
question. Table 2 reports the annual number of trips (weekly number of trips on
average, multiplied by 50) for the whole sample, as well as for various sub-samples.
[Table 2 about here]
We see that as much as 72% report no public-transport trips per week. Women tend to
use public transport to a larger degree, but men tend to make slightly more trips on
average if they use public transport at all. Furthermore, availability of a private car
consistently decreases the mean number of public-transport trips, which is expected.
As is also expected, a larger fraction of people uses public transport in big cities,4
where such transport is more readily available. However, for those who actually use
public transport, the number of trips per time unit is about the same on average in all
sub-groups.
III. ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS
Many of the questionnaires were incomplete, primarily due to incomplete responses on
income. Therefore, the econometric estimations include only 2504 responses out of
3240 in the whole sample. However, using a standard t-test we cannot reject the
hypothesis of equal means in the smaller sample and the whole sample, for either the
annual driving-distance or the annual number of public-transport trips.
Econometric Models
The dependent variables, driving-distance and public-transport use, are censored since
they are zero for a large fraction of the observations; hence, a basic ordinary least
square (OLS) regression would be biased. The most commonly used model to deal
with this problem is perhaps still the standard one-equation Tobit (type 1) model.
However, this model is very restrictive, for example since it is based on the
assumption that the choice whether to drive or not is explained by the same variables,
and in relative terms to the same extent, as how much to drive. But whether to have a
car or not is a quite different decision, compared to the decision how much to drive
given that you have a car. Therefore, two- and three equation models, where the
decision processes are modelled separately, are more appropriate.
The first specification used is that of Cragg (1971), where the probability of a
zero observation is assumed to be independent of the regression model for the positive
observations. Therefore, in the driving-distance case, the three decisions – whether to
have a car or not, whether to drive or not given a car, and how much to drive given a
driving-distance larger than zero – are estimated separately. In the public-transport
case, the two decisions – whether to use public transport or not, and how many trips to
make given a positive use of public transport – are estimated separately. The selection
equation, concerning whether to travel or not, is estimated by a Probit model and given
by:
u ? x d + = '
* (1)5
where  ' x is the vector of independent variables,  ? is the associated parameter vector to
be estimated, and  u is the error term. Only the sign of 
* d is observed, and in our case
* d is either zero or positive. The structural equation, how much to travel, is a truncated
regression model estimated by maximum likelihood:
e ß x Q + = '
* (2)
where  0   if   0
* = = d Q ;  1   if  
* * = = d Q Q .  The expected number of trips, given a positive
number, is given by







z ? =  is Mill’s ratio, where  ) (z F and  ) (z f are the standard normal
distribution function and the standard normal density function, respectively. In the
driving-distance case, we have instead two independent Probit equations followed by
the truncated regression based on the observations with a positive driving-distance.
The assumption of independence can be questioned, however. Assume for
example that both the probability of an annual driving-distance larger than zero (given
a car), and the actual distance driven (given a positive driving-distance), depend
positively on income (which is reasonable). The second (structural) effect can then be
assumed to depend negatively on the first effect, since one may assume that
individuals who change from zero to a positive driving-distance would drive less (on
average) than those who had been driving all the time. This would be the result if the
error terms e and  µ  were positively correlated. It is not equally clear why the first two
Probit stages would be correlated, however.
In the public-transport case, the expected sign from income in the second
stage is not obvious, since higher income will both allow more trips but it will also
allow a switch to more expensive modes (e.g. by private car). Still, at least for the
purpose of comparison, we will assume (or test for) a correlation between the error
terms also in the public-transport case.
The other sequenced model estimated is therefore a  Tobit type 2 model
(Amemiya 1981), where a covariance parameter  ?  between the error terms u and  e is
estimated. Then we have a selection equation
u ? x d + = '
* (4)6
and a structural equation
e ß x Q + = '
* (5)
where again  0   if   0
* = = d Q and  0   if  
* * > = d Q Q . A covariance parameter between the
error terms is estimated
? u e Cov = ] , [ (6)
implying that the expected number of trips, given a positive number, is given by:
)] ' ( ' [ ] 0 [ ? x ?s? ß x Q Q E + = > | )] ' ( ' [ ? x ? ß ß x ? + = (7)
This model is estimated using  Heckman’s (1979) two-step estimation procedure,
where the selection equation (the Probit) is estimated by maximum likelihood and the
structural equation is estimated by ordinary least squares. In the driving-distance case,
we first estimate a  Probit for having a car in the household or not, and then
independently, given a car, estimate a Tobit 2 for the driving-distance decisions. The
Tobit 2 model would collapse to the Cragg model for  0 = ? , if we disregard the fact
that the second step in the Cragg is estimated by a truncated regression.
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Estimating Annual Driving Distance
Table 3 reports the estimated marginal effects for the models discussed.
[Table 3 about here]
The Lambda-coefficient for Tobit 2 has the expected sign but is insignificant and we
can consequently not reject the Cragg model. However, this does not necessarily imply
that the “true” model is close to a Cragg specification, or that the correlation between
the error terms in the two steps is unimportant, since the Probit stage explained the
selection somewhat poorly, which is unfortunately quite common with this type of
models. (The goodness of fit for the Probit equation is relatively low, with a likelihood
ratio index of 0.13.)
Starting with the choice whether to have a car or not in the household we find
that the marginal effect (of variables in log-form) associated with household income is
positive and significant as expected. A one percent increase in household income (per
equivalent adult) would increase the probability of having a car by about 0.034%.
5 We
see that having a partner with income per se seems generally more important for this
choice. The probability increases further with the number of children, which seems
reasonable even though the disposable income per person normally decreases with the7
number of children. The probability increases with age but decreases with age squared,
implying a maximum probability at about 45 years (0.0033/(2*.000037)=45).
For single adult households, men have a larger probability than women of
having a car. The probability is significantly lower in big and intermediate cities but
independent of education. The choice to drive or not, given a car in the household,
follows a similar pattern. This choice, however, is at least partly an individual choice,
for which it is intuitively possible that also individual income (and not only household
income) could be important. Indeed, in this study it is found that only the individual
income matter for the choice whether to drive or not. The probability with respect to
age reaches again its maximum at about 45 years. Living in big cities decreases this
probability, but having access to a company-car increases it.
The reported marginal effects, and their corresponding t-values, for the Cragg
and Tobit 2 models have the same interpretation, and the differences between them are
generally quite small. The reported marginal effect with respect to income can be
interpreted as elasticities for dependent variables in log form, evaluated at sample
mean, i.e. at the mean of the log of driving-distance. For example, a one percent
increase in after-tax income, holding the income of a possible partner constant, would
imply an expected increase in driving-distance by about 0.3% in the Tobit 2 case. A
corresponding increase of the partner’s income would be expected to increase the
driving-distance by only slightly more than 0.02%. If income increases by one percent
for both of them we would have the sum of these effects on driving. Hence, we see
that for an individual’s own driving-distance it is again the individual income, rather
than the household income, that matters. For a dummy variable, such as sex, we have
that men have about 70% longer driving-distance, given that the person drives at all.
The pattern with regards to age is the same here as well, and the effects of living in
cities are insignificant. Having a company-car increases the expected driving-distance
by about 50%.
Being a member of an environmental  organization implies no significant
effects on either the choice of having a car, or whether to drive or how long to drive. If
anything, there may be a small positive effect on the choice to drive given a car. This
may seem surprising since these  organizations often argue forcefully in  favor of
various measures to reduce private car use.8
The income-elasticity of driving
In order to obtain the overall income-elasticity of the expected driving-distance we
simply differentiate the log of the expected Q with respect to the log of income; cf.
McDonald and Moffitt (1980). It follows that:
] 0 [ ] 0 0 Pr[ ] 0 Pr[ ] [ > | > | > > = Q Q E Car Q Car Q E (8)
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Note that the last term in (9) is not strictly identical to the reported marginal effects in
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6 Still, assuming that
] 0 [ ln ] 0 [ln > | » > | Q Q E Q Q E  we get in the Tobit 2 case the overall income-elasticity for
a change in income of both the individual and the partner as 0.038/0.85+(0.090-
0.0061)/0.89+0.295+0.023 = 0.46 < 1.
7 Hence, although car driving increases with
income, the ratio between driving-distance and income decreases strongly with
income.
Estimating Annual Number of Public-transport Trips
Table 4 reports the estimated marginal effects for the econometric models discussed.
[Table 4 about here]
We see generally that the Probit stage seems to be explained better than the subsequent
conditional stages, and in the Tobit 2 case all marginal effects are insignificant. This is
not very surprising given the data presented in table 2, where the mean value of the
annul number of public-transport trips, given a positive use, were almost constant for
different sub-groups. The probability of using public transport decreases with own
income but increases slightly with the partner’s income. The latter effect, however, is
smaller and insignificant. This follows a similar pattern as with driving-distance,9
where both the probability of driving (given a car) and the annual driving-distance,
depend stronger on own income than on the partner’s income. Hence, it seems that in
relations where income differ, the one with a larger income has a larger probability of
using the car, and the one with lower income has a larger probability of using public
transport. (Note that we have corrected for the fact that men drive more than women
per se). Children seem to affect the likelihood negatively, which is reasonable. Age
follows an inverted pattern compared to the driving-distance case, with a minimum
probability of using public transport at about the age of 55. Being highly educated,
woman, and living in a big city increases the probability of using public transport. The
latter is of course largely a result of a larger public-transport supply in big cities
compared to smaller cities and the countryside. Having access to a car decreases the
probability, which is also expected (Golob, 1989).
Focusing on how many trips to make, given a positive use, we see from the
Cragg estimation that the conditional income-elasticity is negative, both with regard to
own income and the partner’s income, which is not obvious. The number of trips to
make reaches a maximum at about the age of 28-30, and living in a big city also
affects the amount of trips positively. The Lambda-coefficient is insignificant in the
public transport case too, which is not surprising for theoretical reasons.
The income-elasticity of public-transport use
In a similar way as for driving-distance, we can calculate the income-elasticity of the
expected number of public-transport trips from table 4. In the Tobit 2 case we have
that the income-elasticity is given by (-0.037+0.014)/0.28-0.058-0.068 = -0.21. In this
calculation the number of cars is treated as given. If we instead take the indirect effect
from the fact that the number of households with access to a car will increase we
should add a term given by –0.203/0.28*0.038/0.85 = -0.03. The overall income-
elasticity, taking the indirect effect of cars into account for the Cragg and Tobit 2
estimations, are then equal to about –0.25. This result should be used with care,
however, since the statistical significance of some factors is rather poor.10
IV. MICRO VERSUS MACRO STUDIES OF CAR USE
The income elasticities in this study are of the same order of magnitude as in other
comparable  disaggregated studies based on micro-data. De  Jong (1990) found an
overall income elasticity of private mileage equal to 0.63 for Holland, where about
50% were due to effects of car ownership. De Jong (1997) found again a similar result
for Holland but also a car-use income elasticity of 0.38 for Norway, and  Bjorner
(1997) obtained a car-use income elasticity of 0.42 for Denmark. Pearman and Button
(1976) reported a car ownership income elasticity of about 0.3 for the UK.
It is interesting to compare these income elasticites with studies based on
aggregated data on national level, which often find an income elasticity of car use of
about unity (or higher). For example, Johansson and Schipper (1997) found income
elasticities of about 1.2, where almost all were due to changes in the number of cars,
based on both cross-sectional variation and time-series variation for a data-set
consisting of 12 OECD countries.  Further, gasoline-demand studies often find an
income-elasticity of demand larger than unity (see e.g. Dahl and Sterner 1991 or
Sterner et al. 1992). Since the gasoline-demand income-elasticity is equal to the travel-
demand elasticity plus the elasticity of fuel intensity per kilometre driven, and the
latter is often rather small (Johansson and Schipper 1997, Dahl 1995), the implicit
travel-demand income elasticities are large also in these studies.
Explaining the elasticity differences
A possible explanation for larger income elasticities in aggregated studies may be that
structural changes follow from increased income over time. For example, when a large
fraction of the population has access to a car, the infrastructure of roads, shops and
various institutions adapt, making it more difficult to live without a car. Consider the
following simple model to illustrate this: Assume that travel demand Q is a function of
private income and infrastructure, we have
) , ( S y q Q = (10)
where S is an index of the (non)accessability of the infrastructure so that









q . The infrastructure, in turn, is a result of both market forces and
political decisions. Consider for example the development of shops. People (naturally)11
prefer low prices and high accessibility (e.g. shops close to where they live), but there
is typically a trade-off between the two since fewer bigger shops in general can
manage to have lower prices. In this trade-off, people with cars would generally prefer
a situation with lower prices and lower accessibility compared to the preferences of
people without cars. Hence, when more people have access to cars and are driving, the
more is S likely to increase by the basic laws of supply and demand. S may also
depend directly on income since, for example, higher income tends to imply a higher
living area per individual, and hence a more scattered living. Political decisions often
go in the same direction, i.e., public planning is (at least to some extent) reflecting
individual preferences and tend over time to be more and more adapted to a society
with cars, when a larger and larger fraction of the population is driving. Thus, we can










. Substituting this into (10) gives
)) , ( , ( y Q s y q Q = (11)
Hence, travel demand depends on income directly, and indirectly through changes in




























implying the following total marginal effect of travel with respect to income:
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In the cross-section case within a country, where everybody has a similar










. , i.e. the partial income elasticity for a fixed infrastructure. But in the case
of time-series, or cross-section between countries with different (mean) incomes, we12
are measuring 
. tot
y s , i.e. the income elasticity including indirect effects trough
endogenous infrastructure changes. There are two different effects working in the
same direction of increasing the estimated income-elasticity compared to
disaggregated analysis within a country. First we have what we may denote the











” s , measuring the percentage
change in travel due to a one percent change in income through the changes in the
infrastructure due to this income increase. Hence, this term is due to infrastructure
changes directly through an income increase, and hence not through increased
























1 , on the other hand, is due to
the fact that the infrastructure changes due to increased transportation, e.g. through an
increased number of out-of-town shopping centres and fewer local stores when
travelling by car increases. Since the empirical results typically indicate a total income
elasticity 
. tot
y s of about 1, and a partial income elasticity 
. part
y s  of about 0.5, we have













y s s s s s s + W + = - =
. . .  would correspond to an income elasticity of
about  5 . 0 5 . 0 1 = - . The relative importance of income induced (
sy
y s ) versus travel
induced (W) changes in infrastructure is still an open question, however.
In addition to direct physical changes there may exist what may be considered
to be sociological explanations related to possible evolutions of social norms and
conventions. Although often overlooked, these ideas are far from novel in economics
(see Mason, 1998). For example, already Adam Smith noted that women in England
required better clothing to appear in public without shame than did women in
Scotland.  In the case of transportation today it may in many countries be considered
necessary to have access to a car in order to function normally, and people may be
excluded from normal social interaction if they do not; cf. Brekke and Howarth
(2000), Galbraith (1991), Sen (1985) and Veblen (1899). Such mechanisms would
thus also work in the direction of increasing the income elasticity gap between
aggregated and disaggregated studies. More research is clearly needed in this area.13
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, annual individual driving-distance by car and number of trips by public
transport are analysed. We have seen that even after correcting for other variables,
such as income, men are driving considerably more, and using less public transport,
compared to women, also in a country like Sweden, which is often considered to have
a relatively high degree of gender equality. As one would be inclined to believe,
people living in big cities are less likely to drive than people living in the countryside.
Hence, the frequent statement that people in the countryside would on average suffer
harder from fuel-price increases (and similar measures) seems correct. However, we
have also seen that this effect is not as large as is often claimed, and that in fact
drivers’ mean driving-distance is about the same in city areas as in the countryside.
Driving increases with income similar to other cross-section studies within a
country or region, but the elasticity is much lower compared to most aggregated
studies on national level. This difference, it is argued, is probably largely due to
structural effects and a simple theoretical model is developed to illustrate this. For
policy considerations it is of course important which income elasticity to choose. For
example, if the purpose is to estimate the distributional effects within a country of a
certain policy measure, the lower elasticity (such as the one in this study) should be
used. Hence, using an income-elasticity based on aggregate data on a national level
would tend to under-estimate possible negative distributional welfare effects. If, on the
other hand, the purpose is mainly to forecast the future long-run traffic changes based
on various assumptions on income growth, the estimated elasticities in this paper (and
similar) offer little help.
9
Contrary to what is implicitly assumed in many applied studies, we have seen
that individual income, and not only household income, is important for explaining
transport demand of different modes. It seems that in partner relations where income
differ, the one with a larger income has a much larger probability of using the car, and
the one with a lower income has a larger probability of using public transport. This
indicates that it may sometimes be questionable to see the household as the only
relevant economic subject in this type of analysis.14
Age is also found to be an important explanatory variable and both the
probability of driving and the expected annual driving-distance reach a peak at about
the age of 50, whereas the probability of using public transport reaches a minimum at
about the same age. Having access to a so called company-car increases the private
driving-distance dramatically, which is expected since the marginal cost is then close
to zero. Being member of an environmental organisation had no significant effect
either on driving or on public-transport use. This indicates that even if the government
(or other authorities) would be successful in changing people’s attitudes in favour of
environmental values, and against private car use, the actual effects in terms of a
changed travel pattern may be smaller than anticipated.
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1 The author is not aware of any earlier research which has modelled driving, or private transport use, as
a three-level decision.
2 “Big cities” are the three biggest cities in Sweden: Stockholm,  Göteborg and  Malmö, with
surroundings. About 27% of the respondents (and the population) live in big cities, 53% live in
“intermediate cities”, and the remaining 20% live in “other areas”.
3 The employee must tax for this benefit, however, but their marginal cost is zero for private trips. The
system is now (after the survey was made) changed in Sweden and the intention is that individuals
should pay their own variable costs for private trips. However, it appears that most users have chosen
the (still-existent) alternative where their variable costs for private trips are zero.
4 The difference in result from the case with a standard OLS in the second stage was always negligible,
however.
5 It is likely that very low reported incomes are positively correlated with positive transfers from the
central or local government, which we have not been able to measure. Therefore, we included both a
dummy variable for individuals with an annual income lower than 20,000 SEK, and a variable equal to
the product of the dummy variable and income. Thus, all reported income parameters, and elasticities,
are associated with individuals with an annual income higher than 20,000  SEK. (1£ = 13.5  SEK,
November 1, 2000.)
6 In other words, the income elasticity of the expected value of driving is not in general identical to the
expected value of the income elasticity.
7 The alternative would be to calculate them by simulation (using another functional form).
8 For the expression in (13) to be finite we clearly need that  1 / / < ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ Q s S q . Otherwise the
equilibrium would not be stable since a small perturbation in travel quantity would induce infrastructure
changes which in turn would increase travel with an amount which is larger or equal to the initial
perturbation, and so forth.
9 In this case it may also be important to take the influence of different age cohorts into account; see for
example Jansson (1989).Table 1. Annual private driving distance in km*10
Mean Std. Median No. zeros Max N
Whole sample 1092 1587 1000 25% 20,000 3065
Given household has a car 1222 1637 1000 16% 20,000 2597
Given positive driving distance 1453 1681 1000 20,000 2305
Given a positive driving
distance and a company car
2303 1817 2000 20,000 365
Men:         all responses 1571 1860 1200 11% 20,000 1532
                 Given a car 1693 1893 1500 4% 20,000 1342
                 Given Q>0 1769 1900 1500 20,000 1284
                 Given Q>0 and
                 Company car
2585 1897 2000 20,000 280
Women:    all responses 615 1060 200 38% 15,000 1533
                 Given a car 719 1106 500 28% 15,000 1255
                 Given Q>0 1000 1192 1000 15,000 903
                 Given Q>0 and
                 Company car
1374 1098 1000 5,000 85
Big city:    all responses 1029 1541 750 31% 20,000 666
                 Given a car 1218 1636 1000 20% 20,000 514
                 Given Q>0 1516 1696 1200 20,000 413
                 Given Q>0 and
                 Company car
2626 2562 2000 20,000 74
Intermediate city:
                 all responses
1101 1531 1000 21% 17,000 1321
                 Given a car 1186 1541 1000 14% 17,000 1179
                 Given Q>0 1382 1580 1000 17,000 1012
                 Given Q>0 and
                 Company car
2222 1523 2000 10,000 177
Other areas: all responses 1121 1680 1000 25% 15,000 1078
                 Given a car 1271 1754 1000 16% 15,000 904
                 Given Q>0 1508 1815 1000 15,000 762
                 Given Q>0 and
                 a Company car
2219 1641 2000 10,000 114Table 2. Annual number of public transport trips
Mean Std. Median No. zeros Max N
Whole sample 91 208 0 72% 2500 3134
Given positive amount of travel 329 279 250 2500 871
Given a car in the household 69 175 0 77% 1500 2645
Men:         all responses 80 206 0 77% 2500 1557
                 Given Q>0 349 301 300 2500 358
                 Given a car 56 158 0 81% 1500 1357
Women:    all responses 103 210 0 67% 1650 1577
                 Given Q>0 315 261 250 1600 513
                 Given a car 82 190 0 73% 1500 1288
Big city:    all responses 171 255 0 51% 1650 681
                 Given Q>0 351 255 300 1650 331
                 Given a car 123 204 0 59% 1000 522
Intermediate city:
                 all responses
64 171 0 79% 1500 1345
                 Given Q>0 299 259 500 1500 287
                 Given a car 58 166 0 81% 1500 1199
Other areas: all responses 76 205 0 77% 2500 1108
                 Given Q>0 334 314 250 2500 253
                 Given a car 53 161 0 82% 1500 924Table 3. Marginal effects (evaluated at sample means) for driving distance by car.
Cragg and Tobit type 2 specifications. t-values (absolute values) in parenthesis















Log (mean household income
+1)
0.038 (2.4)
Log (Income + 1) 0.090 (6.0) 0.294 (5.2) 0.295 (3.9)
Log (Partner’s income +1) -0.0061 (0.4) 0.025 (0.4) 0.023 (0.3)
Partner with income 0.14 (10.3) 0.29 (1.0) -0.0003 (0.0) -0.001 (0.0)
No. children 0.019 (2.5) 0.0074 (1.2) 0.030 (1.3) 0.030 (1.1)
Age 0.0033 (1.3) 0.0074 (3.3) 0.041 (4.5) 0.041 (3.9)
Age*Age -0.000037 (1.5) -0.000082 (3.6) -0.00040 (4.2) -0.00040 (3.7)
Sex (1=male) 0.046 (3.6) 0.16 (9.9) 0.719 (14.6) 0.722 (7.8)
Education (years) -0.0033 (1.5) 0.0009 (0.4)
Env. Org (1=member) -0.0002 (0.009) 0.034 (1.6) 0.057 (0.8) 0.057 (0.7)
Big city (1=living in big city) -0.12 (6.9) -0.036 (2.2) -0.065 (1.0) -0.066 (0.9)
Intermediate city -0.027 (1.6) -0.0014 (0.1) -0.082 (1.6) -0.082 (1.4)
Company car 0.20 (5.1) 0.521 (8.8) 0.494 (4.8)
Lambda 0.128 (0.5)
No. of observations 2504 2155 1823 1823
Log-likelihood -880 -711 -1845 -2650
Restr. Log-likelihood -1011 -926Table 4. Marginal effects (evaluated at sample means) for travel by public transport.
Cragg and Tobit type 2 specifications. t-values (absolute values) in parenthesis
Choice to use public
transport or not.
Probit
How many trips to
make per year, given
positive travel.
Cragg
How many trips to
make per year, given
positive travel.
Tobit 2
Log (Income + 1) -0.037 (1.6) -0.066 (0.8) -0.058 (0.6)
Log (Partner’s income +1) 0.014 (0.5) -0.076 (0.7) -0.068 (0.5)
No. children -0.019 (1.9)
Age -0.024 (6.7) 0.018 (1.3) 0.020 (0.6)
Age*Age 0.00022 (6.0) -0.00032 (2.3) -0.00033 (1.0)
Sex (1=male) -0.10 (5.0) -0.049 (0.7) -0.039 (0.3)
Education (years) 0.015 (5.0) 0.016 (1.4) 0.014 (0.6)
Env. Org (1=member) -0.026 (0.8) 0.158 (1.3) 0.160 (1.0)
Big city (1= living in big city) 0.300 (11.4) 0.317 (3.1) 0.29 (0.8)
Intermediate city 0.074 (3.1) 0.098 (1.0) 0.092 (0.6)
Household owns a car (1=yes) -0.203 (8.0) -0.115 (1.5) -0.085 (0.4)
Lambda 0.35 (0.7)
No. of observations 2504 672 672
Log-likelihood -1202 -858 -852
Restr. Log-likelihood -1456